Nigeria’s reforms are working on paper, but households have yet to feel the benefit. That is a problem for the government weeks before the vote.
Every month, Africa’s statisticians publish numbers that look like progress, and every month households wonder what is being measured. The gap between the two is widest in Nigeria, where inflation fell to 14.06 per cent in October, the fifth consecutive month of moderation, yet a majority of citizens say the country is heading the wrong way.
Kenya’s annual inflation rose to 7.3 per cent in October, its highest since July 2023, as costlier fuel pushed up transport and food prices. South Africa’s reached 5.2 per cent, the highest in almost two and a half years, with fuel inflation at 42.9 per cent. Egypt’s urban rate fell to a nine-month low of 12.7 per cent, but its central bank raised rates again in October, citing regional conflict and higher energy prices.
Yet, Nigeria offers perhaps the clearest illustration of this contradiction. Its government hasembarked on an ambitious programme of economic reforms intended to correct longstanding distortions, restore investor confidence and put public finances on a more sustainable footing. While some macroeconomic indicators have improved, millions of Nigerians continue to experience an economy in which everyday necessities remain increasingly unaffordable.
The central question is no longer simply whether the reforms are working on paper, but whether their benefits are reaching the people expected to endure their costs.
Nigeria’s economic difficulties did not begin with the current administration. Years of expensive fuel subsidies, multiple exchange rates, weak productivity, excessive dependence on oil revenues and mounting public debt created deep structural vulnerabilities. The removal of the petrol subsidy in 2023, the unification and subsequent liberalisation of the foreign exchange market, and wider fiscal adjustments were therefore presented as necessary corrections rather than optional policy choices.
There was a compelling economic argument for these measures. Fuel subsidies consumed public resources, disproportionately benefited wealthier consumers and left little room for investment in infrastructure, healthcare and education. Meanwhile, maintaining an artificially supported exchange rate discouraged investment, encouraged rent-seeking and weakened confidence in the currency.
The reforms have also produced some important gains. Inflation has retreated considerably from its earlier peak, foreign-exchange conditions have improved, external reserves have strengthened and economic growth has shown signs of acceleration. Ending the subsidy has also created additional fiscal room for governments to redirect resources towards development priorities.
Nigeria’s government and its supporters argue that the hardship is transitional; an unavoidable consequence of dismantling an economic model that had become increasingly unsustainable. They contend that maintaining policy discipline will eventually encourage investment, improve productivity and generate broader prosperity. While that argument deserves serious consideration, it surely cannot be the only measure by which the reforms are judged.
The view from the street is what matters and it is considerably less reassuring. Petrol that cost about ₦185 a litre before the subsidy went now sells for between ₦1,325 and ₦1,420 in Abuja. Pump prices have eased slightly this month as crude fell and the Dangote refinery trimmed its loading price, but they remain far above pre-2023 levels. Food inflation, at 19.13 per cent, runs about five points above the headline rate, and food is where poor households spend most of their money. National averages also conceal wide variation: annual inflation was 28.66 per cent in Imo state and 22.81 per cent in Enugu.
A worker on the ₦70,000 minimum wage set in 2024 could buy roughly 50 litres of petrol a month, and little else. Consider the trader who must restock at higher wholesale prices while customers, with less to spend, buy less. A NOI Polls housing survey found that 71 per cent of respondents said paying rent was much harder than three years ago. In another NOI Polls survey, 57 per cent said the country was heading in the wrong direction, and a separate SBM Intelligence tracker put the figure near 80 per cent. Afrobarometer reports widespread hardship across the continent, Nigerians included. The lag between macroeconomic stabilisation and household relief has been longer and harsher than many expected.
Nigeria is Africa’s mirror. The IMF expects sub-Saharan Africa to grow 4.5 per cent this year, one of the fastest rates of any region, yet cautions that the average masks substantial divergence; in Nigeria it has warned that higher prices for essentials will aggravate poverty and food insecurity. Commodity dependence, thin productive capacity, heavy debt-service burdens and weak safety nets mean growth tends to accrue to those already connected to formal markets or export sectors. Nigeria’s public debt stood at ₦159.35 trillion in March, leaving little room for generous relief. Where reform and austerity arrive together, backlash often follows: Kenya’s youth-led protests over tax increases in 2024 are the best-known example, and President William Ruto now seeks a second term with inflation at a three-year high.
The disconnect persists partly because price shocks land at once, while investment, jobs and productivity take years. Transmission is the other part. Poor roads, insecurity that disrupts farming and markets, scarce credit for small businesses and thinly targeted support all blunt the benefits. The political risk is plain. When citizens experience reform only as hardship, trust erodes and the room for further difficult measures narrows. Nigeria elects a president on 16 January, and NOI Polls finds only about 37 per cent of Nigerians expect the 2027 elections to be free and fair.
Nigeria’s reforms may have been necessary, but necessity does not excuse poor sequencing or an inadequate safety net. Governments must make support for the poorest more transparent and reliable, tackle insecurity and bottlenecks that keep food expensive, and accelerate sectors capable of creating large numbers of decent jobs. They must also communicate honestly about the time recovery will take.
The ultimate test of reform is not whether the figures improve, but whether people can afford to live with the result. Nigeria’s experiment will either show that disciplined reform can lift the majority, or reinforce the perception across Africa that growth is a statistic for the few. Its outcome matters far beyond one country’s election cycle.
Nosa Igbinadolor is an Economist. He is a Partner with Path Strategy Consulting
Falling Inflation, rising anger: When Economic Growth Fails to Reach the People
Nigeria’s reforms are working on paper, but households have yet to feel the benefit. That is a problem for the government weeks before the vote.
Every month, Africa’s statisticians publish numbers that look like progress, and every month households wonder what is being measured. The gap between the two is widest in Nigeria, where inflation fell to 14.06 per cent in October, the fifth consecutive month of moderation, yet a majority of citizens say the country is heading the wrong way.
Kenya’s annual inflation rose to 7.3 per cent in October, its highest since July 2023, as costlier fuel pushed up transport and food prices. South Africa’s reached 5.2 per cent, the highest in almost two and a half years, with fuel inflation at 42.9 per cent. Egypt’s urban rate fell to a nine-month low of 12.7 per cent, but its central bank raised rates again in October, citing regional conflict and higher energy prices.
Yet, Nigeria offers perhaps the clearest illustration of this contradiction. Its government hasembarked on an ambitious programme of economic reforms intended to correct longstanding distortions, restore investor confidence and put public finances on a more sustainable footing. While some macroeconomic indicators have improved, millions of Nigerians continue to experience an economy in which everyday necessities remain increasingly unaffordable.
The central question is no longer simply whether the reforms are working on paper, but whether their benefits are reaching the people expected to endure their costs.
Nigeria’s economic difficulties did not begin with the current administration. Years of expensive fuel subsidies, multiple exchange rates, weak productivity, excessive dependence on oil revenues and mounting public debt created deep structural vulnerabilities. The removal of the petrol subsidy in 2023, the unification and subsequent liberalisation of the foreign exchange market, and wider fiscal adjustments were therefore presented as necessary corrections rather than optional policy choices.
There was a compelling economic argument for these measures. Fuel subsidies consumed public resources, disproportionately benefited wealthier consumers and left little room for investment in infrastructure, healthcare and education. Meanwhile, maintaining an artificially supported exchange rate discouraged investment, encouraged rent-seeking and weakened confidence in the currency.
The reforms have also produced some important gains. Inflation has retreated considerably from its earlier peak, foreign-exchange conditions have improved, external reserves have strengthened and economic growth has shown signs of acceleration. Ending the subsidy has also created additional fiscal room for governments to redirect resources towards development priorities.
Nigeria’s government and its supporters argue that the hardship is transitional; an unavoidable consequence of dismantling an economic model that had become increasingly unsustainable. They contend that maintaining policy discipline will eventually encourage investment, improve productivity and generate broader prosperity. While that argument deserves serious consideration, it surely cannot be the only measure by which the reforms are judged.
The view from the street is what matters and it is considerably less reassuring. Petrol that cost about ₦185 a litre before the subsidy went now sells for between ₦1,325 and ₦1,420 in Abuja. Pump prices have eased slightly this month as crude fell and the Dangote refinery trimmed its loading price, but they remain far above pre-2023 levels. Food inflation, at 19.13 per cent, runs about five points above the headline rate, and food is where poor households spend most of their money. National averages also conceal wide variation: annual inflation was 28.66 per cent in Imo state and 22.81 per cent in Enugu.
A worker on the ₦70,000 minimum wage set in 2024 could buy roughly 50 litres of petrol a month, and little else. Consider the trader who must restock at higher wholesale prices while customers, with less to spend, buy less. A NOI Polls housing survey found that 71 per cent of respondents said paying rent was much harder than three years ago. In another NOI Polls survey, 57 per cent said the country was heading in the wrong direction, and a separate SBM Intelligence tracker put the figure near 80 per cent. Afrobarometer reports widespread hardship across the continent, Nigerians included. The lag between macroeconomic stabilisation and household relief has been longer and harsher than many expected.
Nigeria is Africa’s mirror. The IMF expects sub-Saharan Africa to grow 4.5 per cent this year, one of the fastest rates of any region, yet cautions that the average masks substantial divergence; in Nigeria it has warned that higher prices for essentials will aggravate poverty and food insecurity. Commodity dependence, thin productive capacity, heavy debt-service burdens and weak safety nets mean growth tends to accrue to those already connected to formal markets or export sectors. Nigeria’s public debt stood at ₦159.35 trillion in March, leaving little room for generous relief. Where reform and austerity arrive together, backlash often follows: Kenya’s youth-led protests over tax increases in 2024 are the best-known example, and President William Ruto now seeks a second term with inflation at a three-year high.
The disconnect persists partly because price shocks land at once, while investment, jobs and productivity take years. Transmission is the other part. Poor roads, insecurity that disrupts farming and markets, scarce credit for small businesses and thinly targeted support all blunt the benefits. The political risk is plain. When citizens experience reform only as hardship, trust erodes and the room for further difficult measures narrows. Nigeria elects a president on 16 January, and NOI Polls finds only about 37 per cent of Nigerians expect the 2027 elections to be free and fair.
Nigeria’s reforms may have been necessary, but necessity does not excuse poor sequencing or an inadequate safety net. Governments must make support for the poorest more transparent and reliable, tackle insecurity and bottlenecks that keep food expensive, and accelerate sectors capable of creating large numbers of decent jobs. They must also communicate honestly about the time recovery will take.
The ultimate test of reform is not whether the figures improve, but whether people can afford to live with the result. Nigeria’s experiment will either show that disciplined reform can lift the majority, or reinforce the perception across Africa that growth is a statistic for the few. Its outcome matters far beyond one country’s election cycle.
Nosa Igbinadolor is an Economist. He is a Partner with Path Strategy Consulting
Nosa Igbinadolor
ThinkBusiness Africa
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