Exhibition on Nigeria’s water crisis to open at UN City Copenhagen

From 8 to 22 October 2026, UNFPA’s Nordic Representation Office will host “The Stories of a Broken Water Cycle” at UN City, Marmorvej 51. Lokoja Dialogues is presenting the exhibition and a series of dialogue sessions. The programme is meant to bring together business leaders, community representatives, policymakers, development partners and institutions from Nigeria, Denmark and elsewhere. The Nigerian Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning is named as a collaborator alongside Shoreline as a sponsor. At Copenhagen, the collections on display are not for sale. Access to the building requires registration. Enquiries are being directed to nafisaa@lokojadialogues.com and convene@lokojadialogues.com. The figures behind the work are stark. 15 of Nigeria’s 36 states are losing ground to desertification. In some of the hardest-hit places, people get as little as nine liters of water a day. Less than 10% of land that could be irrigated is actually used. The Emir of Argungu, Alhaji Samaila Muhammed Mera, has said that “If nothing is done, life as we know it in these communities will cease to exist”. Water shortages are already a political problem as well as a household one. Forecasts put the number of people who could be pushed from their homes by water scarcity at up to 700 million worldwide by 2030. Around the Lake Chad Basin, fights over water have already turned violent. Some research says fixing regional water shortfalls could add as much as 6% a year to growth. Lokoja Dialogues is an independent non-profit platform dedicated to strengthening Nigeria’s water and climate resilience by connecting grassroots realities with national policy. Spearheaded by key promoters including Founder Polly Alaina and Co-founder Adwoa Edun, the initiative collaborates with local communities and traditional leaders to convert regional water challenges into sustainable, long-term solutions. In August, Lokoja Dialogue held its Inaugural Lagos dialogue, gathering together policymakers, investors and water-sector practitioners to deliberate and offer solutions to Nigeria water problems.
Why Nigeria’s Water Problem Is Also a Market Design Problem

Nigeria’s water crisis cannot be solved by government spending alone. The harder question is how to create a market in which private capital can deliver reliable water while protecting affordability. Nigeria has built water infrastructure for decades, yet much of it does not work. The country’s problem, therefore, may not simply be one of infrastructure. It may be one of market design. That was one of the most provocative conclusions from the inaugural Lagos session of Lokoja Dialogues, where policymakers, investors and water-sector practitioners debated who should build, finance, operate and pay for Nigeria’s water infrastructure. The answers challenged some familiar assumptions. Should government remain the primary developer? Should it be the buyer of water? Should tariffs be kept artificially low? Should private capital be expected to enter without a credible commercial structure? And, perhaps most importantly, who is actually responsible for making the system work? Who owns the water problem? The NSIA CEO raised a seemingly basic question with enormous implications for investors. If an investor wants to develop a water project, who should they negotiate with? The Ministry of Power, Water Resources, a State government, and or another government agency? He argued that the lack of clarity about the appropriate government counterparty can itself discourage investment. For investors, uncertainty about institutional responsibility is itself a risk. A project may be technically feasible and economically desirable. But if the regulatory and contractual architecture is unclear, capital will wait. That is why water-sector reform cannot simply mean allocating more money. It must mean creating clarity about roles, responsibilities, contracts, tariffs and accountability. Government cannot do everything Several speakers at the dialogue challenged the assumption that government should remain at the centre of water delivery. One participant argued that government should establish the policy environment while private companies provide water services where commercially viable. Norbert Shelsuk, a private water developer, was even more direct. His experience suggests that asking government to act simultaneously as developer, offtaker and guarantor can produce projects that eventually fail. Why? Because the underlying commercial model remains weak. In his view, a project requires a credible buyer, a viable tariff and sufficient development capital before it can become a sustainable investment. Government can provide support, but support cannot substitute for a functioning business model. The tariff problem Perhaps no issue is more politically sensitive than water pricing. Governments understandably worry that higher tariffs will make water unaffordable for poor households. But keeping tariffs too low can create another problem: water systems become financially unsustainable. If utilities cannot recover their operating costs, they struggle to maintain infrastructure. If they cannot maintain infrastructure, service deteriorates. If service deteriorates, consumers turn to private alternatives. And households may ultimately pay more. Shelsuk argued that Nigerians are already paying substantial prices for privately supplied water, challenging the assumption that low formal tariffs necessarily translate into affordability. His argument points to a difficult but important policy question: Should government subsidise the price of water, or subsidise access to a properly functioning water market? Lessons from electricity Damilola Ogunbiyi offered a possible model from the electricity sector. She described a structure in which private companies deliver infrastructure while government support makes connections affordable, with subsidy linked to verified delivery rather than simply being paid upfront. There is a lesson here for water. Instead of financing infrastructure irrespective of performance, government could potentially design mechanisms that reward: That would shift the state’s role from being the perpetual provider to being an enabler and market maker. It would also allow public money to leverage private capital rather than attempting to replace it. The infrastructure graveyard The case for reform becomes more compelling when viewed against the apparent scale of underutilised infrastructure. Shelsuk cited figures suggesting that Nigeria has around 1,600 water utilities but only about a quarter are operational. The Lokoja Dialogues team itself cited a figure of 1,412 utilities, with more than 900 described as defunct. But the broad message is that Nigeria has already invested heavily in water infrastructure that is not delivering its full potential. That should change the nature of the policy conversation. The case for investment-grade water Olu Adeosun, chairman of Lokoja Dialogues, used an important phrase during the session: “investment grade.” The objective, he explained, is not merely to do good. Projects should deliver services, be properly maintained and generate sufficient value to continue operating. That is perhaps the bridge between the humanitarian and commercial arguments. Water is a human necessity. But that does not mean water infrastructure cannot also be economically productive. The challenge is to design systems in which the commercial logic supports the social objective using blended finance, targeted subsidies, guarantees, and or carbon finance. The political economy of reform The hardest part will be political. Water is emotionally different from many infrastructure sectors because it is essential to life. Nobody wants a system in which poor households are priced out of basic water. But nobody benefits from a system in which utilities cannot operate, infrastructure collapses and households are forced into more expensive informal markets. The answer is therefore unlikely to be simply “privatise water” or “government must provide free water.” It is more complicated. Government must define the rules and establish standards. The market design must have private sector capable of delivering while financiers must have confidence in revenue structures. From government provider to market architect The emerging proposition from Lokoja Dialogues is that Nigeria needs to change the role of government. Not abandon responsibility, nor withdraw from the sector but move from being the default provider of everything to becoming the architect of a system in which multiple actors can deliver sustainably. The NSIA is already positioning itself to co-invest in water projects that meet its bankability criteria. Umar-Sadiq said projects need to be well prepared, well managed, well governed, have a clear offtake and be capable of scaling. That is the standard Nigeria’s water economy may ultimately have to meet. The country’s water challenge is too large for government budgets alone. But the private sector will not solve it simply because the need is enormous. Capital requires confidence. Confidence requires structure. Structure requires reform. And reform requires government to decide what kind of water market Nigeria actually wants. The
Nigeria’s Water Problem Is Also a Bankability Problem

At the Lokoja Dialogues in Lagos, investors and water developers argued that Nigeria does not merely need more money for water. It needs projects that money can actually invest in. For years, the standard diagnosis of Nigeria’s infrastructure problem has been simple: there is not enough money. The inaugural Lagos dialogue of Lokoja Dialogues suggested a more complicated answer. In the water sector, at least, the problem may be that Nigeria has not yet built enough investable projects. That distinction could determine whether the country’s enormous water infrastructure deficit becomes an economic burden or an investment opportunity. Aminu Umar-Sadiq, Managing Director of the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority, made clear that capital can be mobilised for water — but only when projects are properly prepared, structured and governed. His institution is already developing financing mechanisms involving guarantees, project preparation facilities and viability-gap financing. But perhaps the most revealing contribution came from private water developer Norbert Shelsuk. His message to investors was blunt: a government guarantee does not automatically make a water project bankable. The three problems investors must solve Shelsuk identified three critical components for successful water projects. First is the offtaker — someone credible who will purchase the water. Second is the tariff — a pricing structure that allows the project to recover its costs. Third is development capital — the money required to take a project from an idea to something that financiers can actually assess and fund. The third problem is particularly important. Infrastructure investors typically prefer projects that are already sufficiently developed to allow them to assess risks, costs, revenues and returns. But getting to that stage itself requires money. Engineeringstudies, environmental assessments, lega; work, financial modelling, governmnet engagements, and land and technical costs all costs money. The paradox is that investors often want a bankable project before providing the money needed to make it bankable. Shelsuk said his own project has been in development since 2014, illustrating the time and cost involved in moving a major water project through the development process. That is not merely a financing problem. It is a project-preparation problem. The NSIA model Umar-Sadiq explained that the authority is combining project-preparation support with viability-gap financing, financing facilities and guarantees to make large infrastructure projects capable of attracting capital. The objective is straightforward: take projects that are economically important but commercially difficult, improve their structure, reduce risks and create a pathway for private capital. NSIA is also involved in the Green Guarantee Company, established alongside international partners. According to Umar-Sadiq, the facility had recently attracted an additional $30 million, bringing its capitalisation to $130 million and enabling it to provide guarantees of up to $4 billion. That points towards an important evolution in infrastructure finance. Government and development institutions do not necessarily need to fund the entire cost of water infrastructure. They can instead help de-risk projects sufficiently for institutional and private investors to participate. The tariff dilemma But finance cannot solve a business model that does not work. And water pricing remains one of the sector’s most difficult questions. Shelsuk challenged the conventional understanding of affordability. He argued that Nigerians are already paying significant amounts for privately supplied water, even while formal public tariffs remain insufficient to support investment. The argument raises an uncomfortable question: Is cheap formal water actually expensive for Nigeria when it results in unreliable service, private household spending and underinvestment in infrastructure? The answer requires more than simply raising tariffs. A commercially viable water market must also protect vulnerable consumers. That suggests the policy challenge is not simply to subsidise water. It is to design subsidies intelligently. Damilola Ogunbiyi, the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Sustainable Energy for All and Co – Chair of UN – Energy, speaking during the dialogue, offered an example from the electricity sector. Under a decentralised energy model, she explained, government can support private providers through targeted subsidies while ensuring that subsidies are tied to actual delivery and measurable connections. The lesson for water is potentially significant. Instead of subsidising inefficient systems indefinitely, government could support verified service delivery, while allowing private operators to build sustainable businesses around it. The carbon opportunity Another layer of the investment equation is emerging through carbon markets. Umar-Sadiq argued that Nigeria’s environmental projects can potentially generate carbon credits that attract hard-currency investment — but only where the regulatory framework gives investors confidence about ownership and monetisation. The Lokoja Dialogues chairman, Olu Adeosun, took the argument further. He pointed to the possibility of combining properly designed borehole projects with carbon-credit mechanisms. The logic is that replacing firewood use with cleaner water systems can reduce pressure on forests and potentially generate environmental value. This turns a basic water intervention into something potentially capable of attracting multiple forms of financing. The opportunity is to structure water, climate, infrastructure, carbon, and community development together. The NSIA investment test The final question, of course, is whether NSIA itself sees water as investable. In an interview after the session, Umar-Sadiq was unequivocal. NSIA has an infrastructure fund, he said, and water is one of its focus sectors alongside healthcare and agriculture. If opportunities emerging from Lokoja Dialogues meet NSIA’s bankability criteria, the authority would be willing to co-invest. And what determines bankability? His answer is revealing: “Well prepared, well managed, well governed” projects with a clear offtake and capacity to scale. That may be the central lesson from Lagos. Nigeria does not simply need more water projects. It needs a pipeline of well-prepared, commercially structured and investment-ready water projects. The opportunity is potentially enormous. But the money will not come simply because the need is enormous. It will come when Nigeria can demonstrate that solving the water problem can also produce sustainable economic value.